The relationship between the selective Nuremberg trial evidence of the Holocaust and the role of Western intelligence agencies in monitoring this systematic genocide by the Nazi regime as it occurred has become controversial. In particular, wartime intelligence agencies stand accused of virtually turning a blind eye to this genocide, preferring to concentrate their efforts on securing military objectives related to the defeat of the Nazis.The present book demonstrates, on the basis of recently declassified CIA and other intelligence records, that this accusation now requires revision. Whilst there remains grounds for criticizing the wartime actions and omissions of intelligence agencies, it is arguable that their efforts in this area regarding incriminating witness testimony, documentation and other evidence, and in tracking down and interrogating those responsible for anti-Semitic art looting and preparing prosecution strategy were amongst the least inadequate of the official responses, and that many intelligence officials played a largely commendable role in gathering, analyzing and - in some cases - actually presenting Nuremberg trial evidence in various formats.