"Joan Weiner reads Frege without assuming that his problems and concepts anticipate ours or that he is reacting to his historical context. This leads her to conclude that Frege"s notion of reference differs importantly from that of today"s philosophy of language and that his supposed Platonist declarations little support contemporary Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. More radically, she holds that the bulk of Frege"s so-called philosophical writings should be seen as attempting to elucidate his symbolic language and not as metaphysical and linguistic theories. Weiner deploys intricate, careful, and well-documented argument to defend these conclusions."--The Philosophical Review "Like other scholars, Weiner registers more than a few reservations about Frege"s works. However, as the title of her book shows, she believes that Frege"s work still has great perspectives, and that present and future scholars will continue to derive from it threads for further meditations and researches. With great care, Weiner examines many of Frege"s revolutionary theses and many of the problems he set out; approves or questions his solutions of these problems; and adds to Frege"s solutions her own."--Semiotica