Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and foster competition. At first glance, however, it is often unclear whether certain business practices have positive or detrimental effects. Some activities that appear anticompetitive can actually prove beneficial to consumers. In Antitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints leading law and economics scholars take a hard look at how vertical restraints limit the conditions under which firms may purchase, sell, or resell a good or service. Vertical restraints can be defined as any arrangement between firms operating at different levels of the manufacturing or distribution chain that restricts the conditions under which such firms may purchase, sell or resell. Business tying and bundling practices, as one example, often come under scrutiny for depriving consumers of choice and driving up prices. In practice, however, bundling can lower costs and increase convenience. In order to formulate efficient policy, we must be able to identify and limit those practices that are likely to do more harm than good. It is critical that policymakers and analysts know which vertical restraints are likely to harm consumers more than they benefit competition. The authors, representing both sides of the debate over tying practices, provide a broad and informed perspective on this important issue. Contributors: Dennis Carlton (University of Chicago), David Evans (University College London), Bruce Kobayashi (George Mason University), and Michael Waldman (Cornell University).