If we are to trust military historian Richard Connaughton"s account, the Japanese forces that invaded the Philippines shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor were fortunate that they faced Douglas MacArthur and not some competent and cautious general like Joseph Stilwell. MacArthur, writes Connaughton, "was a distant, remote, suspicious, and brooding man whose ego set him apart from others in the services." There"s no news in that assessment--MacArthur was infamous long before the Japanese attack for his imperious manner and sense of infallibility, and during the siege of Corregidor he earned the nickname "Dugout Doug" for secluding himself in a bunker far from his troops. What does come as news is in Connaughton"s in-depth analysis of MacArthur"s multifaceted failings as commander of American forces in the Philippines, which include his refusal to accept intelligence reports on the whereabouts and strength of his enemy, his failure to integrate Filipino forces effectively, and his strategically inept forward defense--all of which afforded an undersize Japanese invading force a comparatively easy victory. Connaughton, a retired colonel in the British Army, has no particular stake in defending or disparaging MacArthur, around whom stands a lively literature both pro and con. In fairness, he observes, the American defense of the Philippines was doomed in any event; and, he adds, "MacArthur made monstrous blunders but it was not all his fault; he had a lot of help." His book throws new light on a crucial episode in the history of World War II, and it is likely to excite debate among students of military history. --Gregory McNamee